

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 014537  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:JKALICKI:PM:GOPLINGER

APPROVED BY EUR - A.HARTMAN

P - DTICE

T - EMCGAFFIGA

PM -LGELB

C - LFUERTH

S/S - MR. SHANKLE

NSC - JTUCHMAN

P - DODONOHUE

-----220157Z 006592 /62

O 220114Z JAN 77 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

S E C R E T STATE 014537

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, TECH, BR, GW, NL

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY: BRAZIL AND SAFEGUARDS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. AS BACKGROUND FOR HIS MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT,  
YOU SHOULD ADVISE FON MIN VAN DER STOEL IN STRICT  
CONFIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH FRG AND  
BRAZIL AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH

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PARTIES. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ISSUE IS OF UTMOST  
SENSITIVITY AND SHOULD BE HANDLED BETWEEN US ON STRICTLY  
BILATERAL BASIS IN TERMS OF US POSITION.

2. WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT CAREFULLY BEFORE GON  
MAKES ANY DECISION ON MATTER. VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE IS  
BRIEFED TO COVER SUBJECT IN GENERAL TERMS, AND WE SHOULD

EXPLORE PROBLEM IN DETAIL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS  
THEREAFTER.

3. VAN DER STOEL SHOULD BE AWARE THAT OUR CONCERN WITH  
FRG/BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT ARISES FROM THE PROPOSED  
TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECH-  
NOLOGY ITSELF, AND NOT FROM INADEQUACIES OF SAFEGUARDS  
ATTACHED TO THESE TRANSFERS OR TO BRAZIL'S PROGRAM  
GENERALLY. A CENTRAL THRUST OF OUR MULTILATERAL  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS HAS BEEN TO PREVENT  
FURTHER SENSITIVE TRANSFERS ON GROUNDS THAT SAFEGUARDS,  
HOWEVER EFFECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE, MAY BE WITHDRAWN  
OR ABROGATED, LEAVING RECIPIENT OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY WITH  
DIRECT ACCESS TO WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL.

4. SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS OF FRG/BRAZIL CONTRACT ARE QUITE  
FAR-REACHING AND DO REQUIRE THAT ANY FACILITIES BRAZIL  
MIGHT CONSTRUCT BASED ON FRG-TRANSFERRED TECHNOLOGY WOULD  
ALSO HAVE TO BE SAFEGUARDED. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT  
BRAZIL AGREE TO SAFEGUARD ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES FROM  
WHATEVER SOURCE WOULD BE USEFUL AND WELCOME, BUT WOULD DO  
LITTLE TO ALLEVIATE OUR CONCERN WITH THIS CONTRACT.

5. QUESTION OF COMPREHENSIVE ("FULL-SCOPE") SAFEGUARDS  
AS GENERAL SUPPLIER REQUIREMENT IS CURRENTLY UNDER  
DISCUSSION IN LONDON SUPPLIER TALKS, AND UK STRONGLY  
SUPPORTS ADOPTION. THIS MAY BE SOURCE OF DUTCH BELIEF  
THAT THIS COULD PROVIDE "FOOLPROOF" RESOLUTION OF BRAZIL  
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GUARDS WOULD BE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OVERALL NON-  
PROLIFERATION REGIME, BUT THEY CANNOT DEAL WITH AND  
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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:SGOLDSMITH:WES

APPROVED BY: S/S-O: SGOLDSMITH

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O 232020Z JAN 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 014537

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TOVIP 01 - FOR S/S PARTY PASS TO ASSISTANT SECY HARTMAN

FOL REPEAT OF STATE 014537 TO THE HAGUE INFO BONN BRASILIA

JAN 22

QTE:

S E C R E T STATE 014537

NODIS

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** INSTRUCTIONS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, CAT-B, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR FUELS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** JKALICKI:PM:GOPLINGER  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770127/aaaaaxku.tel  
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**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
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**Message ID:** dbbeb7d2-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Page Count:** 4  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
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**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3529393  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY: BRAZIL AND SAFEGUARDS  
**TAGS:** MNUC, PARM, TECH, BR, GE, NL, US, (VAN DER STOEL, MAX)  
**To:** THE HAGUE BONN MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009